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The Deeper Challenges 
of Global Terrorism: 
A Democratizing Response 
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss1 
Answering the terrorist challenge 
The audacious and gruesome terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, along with the military response , have 
been the defining political events of this new millennium. The 
most profound challenge directed at the international com-
munity, and to all of us, is to choose between two alternative 
visions. What we call the traditional statist response emphasizes 
'national security' as the cornerstone of human security. Central-
ization of domestic authority, secrecy, militarism, nationalism , 
and an emphasis on unconditional citizen loyalty, to her or his 
state as the primary organizing feature of international politics 
are all attributes of this approach. 
We recommend an alternative vision, one that we call democratic 
transnationalism. Democratic transnationalism attempts to draw 
on the successes of democratic, particularly multinational demo-
cratic, domestic orders as a model for achieving human security 
in the international sphere. This approach calls for the resolution 
of political conflict through an open transnational citizen/societal 
(rather than state or market) centred political process legitimized 
by fairness, adherence to human rights, the rule of law, and 
representative community participation. The promotion of secur-
ity for individuals and groups through international human rights 
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law in general, as reinforced by the incipient international criminal 
court with its stress on an ethos of individual legal responsibility, 
assessed within a reliable constitutional setting, is a crucial element 
of this democratic transnationalist vision, which aspires to achieve 
a cosmopolitan reach. 
Before the events of September 11 we had argued in favour of 
the establishment of a distinct, global institutional voice for the 
peoples of the world as a beneficial next step to be taken to carry 
forward the transnational democratic project. We proposed a 
GPA, which we have variously identified as a Global Parliamentary 
Assembly, and interchangeably as a Global Peoples' Assembly.2 So 
far we have deliberately refrained from setting forth a detailed 
blueprint of our proposal, partly to encourage a wide debate 
about the general idea, partly to generate a sense of democratic 
participation in the process of establishing such a populist insti-
tution. We have expressed a tentative preference for representa-
tion on a basis that would to the extent possible incorporate the 
principle of one person one vote. The eventual goal would be to 
enfranchise as voting constituents all citizens of the planet above 
a certain age. We have further taken the position that the CPA 
should not interfere in matters appropriately defined as within 
'the internal affairs of states', although acknowledging that the 
extent of such deference is bound to shift through time and often 
be controversial in concrete instances. The main mission of the 
GPA would be to playa role in democratizing the formulation 
and implementation of global policy. It is our conviction that 
such an assembly's powers should always be exercised in conform-
ity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other 
widely accepted international human rights instruments. 
We believe that carrying out the transnational democratic 
project, including establishing the CPA, should be treated as part 
of the political response to the challenges posed by the sort of 
mega-terrorism associated with the September 11 attacks. Trans-
national terrorism, which consists of networks of dedicated 
extremists organized across many borders, of which al Qaeda is 
exemplary, is so constituted that its grievances, goals, recruitment 
tactics and membership, as well as its objects of attack, are all 
wholly transnational. This form of political violence is a new 
phenomenon. It is the frightfully dark side of an otherwise mostly 
promising trend toward the t.ransnationalization of politics. This 
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lrend, a result of economic and cultural globalization, has mani-
fested itself in a pronounced way since the street demonstrations 
staged against the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. 
The state-centric structures of the international system are not 
adequate to address this new transnational societal activism and, 
in fact, the arbitrary territorial constraints on the organization of 
work and life have intensified various forms of frustration, which 
feed the rise of transnational terrorism. One cause of this frus-
tration is that globalization in all its dimensions is bringing witl1 
it changes of great magnitude that often directly impact on the 
lives of individuals and regions. These changes range from grow-
ing income inequality within and between many societies to 
powerful assaults on cultural traditions that offend non-Western 
peoples. Adverse impacts of globalization on many adherents of 
Islam have definitely induced political extremism in recent dec-
ades even before September 11 , starting with the Iranian Revolu-
tion of the late 1970s. 
Even in democratic societies there is a growing sense that 
domestic politics is not capable of responding creatively to long-
range challenges of regional and global scope. It is certainly the 
case that the magnitude of these challenges is well beyond the 
capacities of even the strongest of states to shape benevolently on 
their own. At the same time individuals have an ever-greater 
incentive to influence global decision-making through their use 
of the technologies of globalization, especially the Internet. Infor-
mation technology has given individuals an unprecedented ability 
to increase their leverage on public issues by making common 
cause with like-minded others without regard to considerations of 
geography or nationality. 
An institutional framework such as that which would be pro-
vided by a CPA is a democratic way to begin peacefully to 
accommodate this new internationalization of civic politics. Indi-
viduals and groups could channel their frustrations into efforts to 
attempt to participate in and influence parliamentary decision-
making as they have become accustomed to doing in the more 
democratic societies of the world. Presently, with trivial excep-
tions, individuals, groups and their associations are denied an 
official role in global political institutions where decision-making 
is dominated by elites who have been officially designated by 
states. Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United 
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Nations, the World Trade Organization and the International 
Monetary Fund are run as exclusive membership organizations, 
operated by and for states. With the possibility of direct and 
formalized participation in the international system foreclosed, 
frustrated individuals and groups (especially when their own 
governments are viewed as illegitimate or host.ile) have been 
turning to various modes of civic resistance, both peaceful and 
violent. Global terrorism is at the violent end of this spectrum of 
transnational protest, and its apparent agenda may be mainly 
driven by religious, ideological and regional goals rather than by 
resistance directly linked to globalization. But its extremist alien-
ation is partly, at the very least, an indirect result of globalizing 
impacts that may be transmuted in the political unconscious of 
those so afflicted into grievances associated with cultural 
injustices. 
In addition to helping provide a non-violent and democralic 
channel for frustrated individuals and groups to affect meaning-
fully global decision-making, a GPA has the potential to provide a 
way of helping to resolve inter-societal and more recently inter-
civilizational conflict and polarization. Presen tly, the institutions 
around which citizen politics is formally structured are confined 
within distinct domestic pohtical systems. This makes a unified 
human dialogue on issues of shared concern impossible. j\J1d 
transnational remedies for perceived injustices are not available. 
In a globalizing world it is crucial to encourage debate and 
discussion of global issues that builds consensus, acknowledges 
grievances, and identifies cleavages in a manner that is not 
dominated by the borders of sovereign territorial states, or even 
by innovative regional frames of reference as in Europe . .As a 
consequence of this existing pattern of fragmentation in the 
political order, societies and cultures develop their own distinctive 
and generally self-serving distortions and myths, or perhaps, at 
the very least, experience exaggerated differences of percepti~11 
that feed pre-existing patterns of conflict. Most persons ;0th111 
one society have little difficulty ident.ifying the distorted percep-
tions of others, but tend to be oblivious to their own biases, t\11 
insensitivity nurtured by mainstream media especially in the midsl 
of major crises. The oft heard American response to the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, 'Why do they hate us so?' and the seething anger 
in the Muslim world that has risen to the surface in the aftermath 
RICHARD FALK AND ANDREW STRAUSS 207 
of the attacks starkly demonstrate just how profound and tragic is 
the perception gap for societies on both sides of this now crucial 
civilizational and societal divide. 
The establishment of a CPA provides one way to address 
constructively this perception gap. Like all elected assemblies, a 
GPA would be a forum engendering debate on the main global 
controversies, especially as they affect the peoples of the world. 
Because elected delegates would be responsive to their respective 
constituencies, and because the media would cover proceedings, 
this debate would likely exert an influence far beyond the parlia-
mentary chambers. Its echoes would be heard on editorial pages, 
listservs, and TV, in schools and churches, and in assorted discus-
sions at all levels of social interaction around the world. Spokes-
persons directly connected to aggrieved groups of citizens would 
have a new transnational public arena to voice their opinions and 
grievances, as well as to encounter opposed views. Those attacked 
or criticized would have ample opportunity to defend themselves 
and express their counter-claims. From such exchanges would 
come the same pull toward a less confrontational understanding 
between diverse groups of citizens that we find within the more 
successful domestic democratic systems of the world. Of course, 
complete agreement would never be ach ieved and is not even a 
worthy goal. Conformity of outlook is never healthy for a political 
community, but it is especially inappropriate in a global setting, 
given the unevenness of economic and cultural circumstances 
that exist. in the world. But a CPA process could at least greatly 
faCilitate convergent perceptions of reality, thereby making con-
troversies about problems and solutions more likely to be produc-
tive, including a mutual appreciation and acceptance of 
differences in values, priorities and situations. 
In addition to helping reduce the perception gap as an under-
lying cause of social tensions, a CPA would further promote the 
peaceful resolution of enduring social tensions by encouraging 
reliance on procedures for reaching decisions based 011 compro-
mise and accommodation. Even where mutually acceptable solu-
tions are not immediately achievable, parliamentary systems of 
lawmaking and communication, if functioning well, at least pro-
vide a civil forum where adversaries can peacefully debate and 
clarify their differences. If such institutions generate community 
respect and gain legitimacy, then those who do not get their way 
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on a particular issue will be generally far more inclined to accept 
defeat out of a belief in the fairness of the process and with an 
understanding that they can continue to press their case in the 
future. 
Of course, the brand of Muslim fundamentalism embraced by 
Osama bin Laden is illiberal and anti-democratic in the extreme. 
Given the existence of such extremism, it is appropriate to 
question the ability of liberal democratic institutions to absorb 
successfully those who share the worldview of al Qaeda, or adhere 
to similar orientations. One of the impressive features of liberal 
parliamentary process, however, is its considerable ability to assim-
ilate many of those who do reject its democratic outlook. Because 
parliamentary process invites participation and because it has the 
politically powerful capacity to confer or deny the imprimatur of 
popular legitimacy upon a political position, experience at the 
domestic level suggests that even those with radical political 
agendas will seldom decline the opportunity to participate. In the 
United States, for example, those on the Christian right who have 
deep religious doubts about the validity of secular political insti-
tutions have not only participated in the parliamentary process, 
but have done so at times with zeal, tactical ingenuity, and 
considerable success despite their minority status. In other 
countries, small political parties at the ' margins of public opinion 
often exert disproportionate influence in situations where a 
majority position is difficult for dominant parties to achieve. By 
participating in the process they have come to accept, at least in 
practice, the legitimacy of these institutions and procedures for 
societal decision-making. 
Somewhat analogously, in the Cold War era the orthodoX 
Soviet-inspired critique of the American system nominally 
accepted by those American Communists represented by the 
Communist Workers Party included a rejection of 'bourgeois' 
rights in favour of what was then identified as 'the dictatorship of 
the proletariat'. Yet, despite their professed rejection of 'bour-
geois democracy', their leader Gus Hall ran for President of the 
United States repeatedly in an attempt to gain a tiny bit of 
electoral legitimacy for his position of isolation at the outermost 
reaches of public opinion. The relative domestic openness of the 
American political process helps explains why the United StateS 
has suffered relatively little indigenous political violence in the 
l 
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twentieth century. During the period of heightened political 
tensions in the 1960s, groups committed to violence such as the 
Weather Underground, unlike al Qaeda today, could not attract 
Popular support for their radical rejection of the American gov-
erning process, and never became more than a nuisance, posing 
Only the most tangential threat to the security, much less the 
Stability, of the country. This lack of societal resonance soon leads 
to the decay, demoralization and collapse of such extremist 
groups, a dynamic of rejection that is far more effective in 
prOtecting society than law enforcement is even if enhanced by 
emergency powers as is the case in wartime conditions. To a lesser 
e~tent, the same self-destruct process seems to have kept the 
rIght-Wing militia movement from posing a major threat to civic 
order, although it was indirectly responsible for inspiring the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. This phenomenon with variations 
can be observed within all of the more democratic systems of the 
world. The Osama bin Ladens of tl1e planet would be highly 
unlikely themselves to participate in a global parliamentary pro-
cess, but their likely ability to attract any significant following 
wOuld be substantially undermined to the extent that such an 
Institution existed and gave the most disadvantaged and aggrieved 
Peoples in the world a sense tl1at their concerns were being 
tn.eaningfully addressed. Indeed, if such a safety valve existed, it 
tn.' Ight prevent, or at least discourage, tl1e emergence of the 
Osalha syndrome, that the only way to challenge the existing 
a:rangement of power and influence is by engaging in totalizing 
VIolence against its civilian infrastructure. 
Civic activism: setting the stage for a GPA 
We believe that the underlying preconditions for a CPA are being 
created by the way that civic politics is increasingly challenging the 
aUtonomy of the state-centric international system. In one of the 
tn.OSt Significant, if still under-recognized, developments of the last 
~evera~ years, both civic voluntary organizations and business and 
nannal elites are engaged in creating parallel structures that 
clomplement and erode the traditionally exclusive role of states as 
t 1e only legitimate actors in the global political system. Individuals 
and groups, and their numerous transnational associations, rising 
up from and challenging the confines of territorial states, are 
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promoting 'globalization-from-below', and have begun to coalesce 
into what is now recognized as being a rudimentary 'global civil 
society'. Business and financial elites, on their side, acting largely 
to facilitate economic globalization, have launched a variety of 
mechanisms to promote their own preferred global policy initia-
tives, a process that can be described as 'globalization-from-above '. 
While these new developments are rendering the territorial sover-
eignty paradigm partially anachronistic, they are still very far from 
supplanting the old order, or even providing a design for a 
coherent democratic system of representation that operates on a 
truly global scale. Until the international community creates such 
a representative structure, the ongoing tension between the demo-
cratic ideal and the global reality will remain unresolved. And we 
will continue to be plagued by an incoherent global political 
structure in which the peoples of the world are not offered the sort 
of democratic alternative to violence that is increasingly considered 
the sine qua non of legitimate domestic governance. 
The organizations of global civil society 
Is this coalescence of personal initiatives wit.h an array of transna-
tional initiatives that we identify as global civil society capable of 
mounting a transformative challenge to the customary role of 
states as the representatives of their citizens in the international 
system? Civil society, roughly defined as the politically organized 
citizenry, is mostly decentralized, broken down into non-profit 
organizations and voluntary associations dedicated to a wide 
variety of mostly liberal, humanitarian and social causes (though 
some decidedly illiberal and anti-liberal, of which terrorist and 
criminal networks are the worrisome instance). TransnationaJly, 
the largest and most prominent of tl1ese organizations bear such 
respected names as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfarn, 
and tlle International Committee of the Red Cross. There 
are now more than 3,000 civil society organizations either 
granted consultative status by the United Nations Economic an.d 
Social Councilor associated with the UN Department of publle 
Information. 
As described by Jessica Mathews in her landmark 1997 article 
in FOTeign Affairs,S global civil society gained significantly in influ-
ence during the second half, and particularly the last quarter, of 
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the twentieth century. The early 1990s, however, was the time 
when civic transnationalism really came of age. If any single 
occasion deserves to be identified with the emergence of civil 
society on the global scene it would probably be the June 1992 
DN Conference on the Environment. and Development held in 
Rio de Janeiro. More than 1,500 civil society organizations were 
accrf'dited to participate and 25,000 individuals from around the 
world took part in parallel NCO forums and activitie. Civic 
associations and their representatives were for the first time 
recognized as an imponant and independent presence at a major 
World inter-governmental conference. The Rio Conference, partly 
responsive to this active involvement of global civil society, pro-
duced four major policy-making instruments:] 
Mter Rio the pattern intensified. In the first half of the 1990s 
there were several other major global conferences under UN 
auspices at which civil society participation was an important 
factor. The most significant of these dealt with human rights 
(Vienna 1993), population (Cairo 1994), and women (Beijing 
1995) . The democratizing success ofthese global events produced 
a backlash among several major governments, especially the 
United States. The result in the hort term has been the virtual 
abandonment of such conferences by the United Nations, suppos-
edly for fiscal reasons, but actually because governments were 
afraid of losing some of their control over global policy-making. 
With the exception of tlle racism conference in Durban, South 
Mrica, during 2001, there has been no major conference of this 
SOrt in the new millennium. It is important to evaluate this 
experience in the setting of the quest. for global democracy. 
There is little doubt that these conferences in the 1990s did a 
great deal to establish the role and presence of civil society as a 
Significant player in the global arena. 
When the 1990s came to an end, the decade's balance sheet of 
accomplishments reflected for the first time in history the impact 
of global civil society. These transnational forces had been instru-
mental in promoting treaties to deal with global warming, estab-
lish an international criminal court and outlaw anti-personnel 
landmines. These same actors were also influential during these 
years in persuading the International Court. of Justice to render 
an Advisory Opinion on the legali ty of nuclear weapons and in 
defeating an OECD attempt to gain acceptance for a multilateral 
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investment agreement. This global populist movement at the turn 
of the millennium gained widespread attention through its advo-
cacy of the cancellation of the foreign debts of the world's poorest 
coun tries. While all of these efforts to a greater or lesser extent 
remain works-in-progress, civil society has clearly been indispens-
able in achieving current levels of success. 
During the formative years of the 1990s the most visible 
gatherings of civil society organizations took place beneath the 
shadow of large multilateral conferences of states. As the decade 
drew to a close, and with these conferences, at least in the near 
term, mostly foreclosed, something different began to occur. The 
multitude of global civil society organizations began to act on 
their own, admittedly in an exploratory and highly uncertain 
fashion, and yet independently of states and international insti-
tutions. For instance, in May 1999 at The Hague Appeal for 
Peace, 8,000 individuals, mostly representing civil society organi-
zations from around the world, and given heart by the presence 
of such luminaries as Nobel Peace Laureates Archbishop Des-
mond Tutu,Jose Ramos-Horta, and Jody Williams, met to shape a 
strategy for the future and to agree on a common agenda. 
Throughout the fo llowing year there were similar though smaller 
meetings in Seoul, Montreal, Germany, and elsewhere. 
These meetings were a prelude to the Millennium NGO Forum 
held at tl1e UN in May 2000 at the initiative of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan. It was an expression of his 'partnership 
policy' to reach out to non-state actors of both a civic and a 
market character. The Secretary-General invited some 1,400 indi-
viduals from international civil society to UN Headquarters in 
New York to present their views on global issues and to debate an 
organizational structure that might enable the peoples of the 
world to participate effectively in global decision-making. That 
UN Millennium Forum agreed to establish a permanenuy consti-
tuted assembly of civil society organizations called t.he Civil Society 
Forum that is mandated to meet at least every two to three years, 
scheduled so as to precede the annual sessions of the UN General 
Assembly. While progress has been uneven, civil society has been 
continuing to work in the face of statist resistance and skepticism 
to bring th is forum into fruition. 
Many activi LS wiLhin global civil society regard this UN millen-
nial initiative as the first step toward the establishment of a 
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popular assembly that would meet at regular intervals, if not on a 
continuous basis. The emergence of such a Civil Society Forum 
might over time come to be recognized as an important bar-
ometer of world public opinion, and significantly, from the 
perspective of this chapter, could be seen as a preliminary, yet 
significant, step on the path to the establishment of a CPA. 
The global business elite at Davos 
Complicating, yet undeniably crucial to the dynamics of global 
democratization, are the efforts of business and finance to 
reshape tl1e international order to render the global market-
place more amenable to the expansion of trade and investment. 
Transnational business and financial elites have so far clearly 
been more successful tl1an civil society. Through their informal 
networks and their stature in society, financial and business elites 
often blend seamlessly with national and international structures 
of governance. State emissaries to the international system are 
frequently chosen directly from their ranks, and the accept-
ance of the neo-liberal economic ideology as tantamount to the 
official ideology not only of international economic institutions, 
but of other international organizations and most governments, 
has given business and banking leaders an extraordinary influ-
ence on global policy. Even in formerly exclusive arenas of state 
action, these private sector actors are flexing their muscles. As 
an indication of this expanding international influence, by 
bringing business and banking officials into United Nations 
policy-making circles for the first time, the UN Secretary-General 
has made 'partnering' with the business community a major 
hallmark of his leadership. The United Nations has now estab-
lished a formal business advisory counci l that is meant to insti-
tutionalize a permanent relationship between the business 
community and the UN, as well as initiated a 'Global Compact' in 
which major multinationals sign on to a set of guidelines that 
commits them to uphold international standards pertaining to 
environment, human rights and labour practices in exchange for 
being given what amounts to a UN stamp of approval for their 
conduct. 
As with civic groups, elite business participation in this emerg-
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ing globalism is in the process of transforming itself into an 
informal institutional structure that indirectly challenges the sta-
tist paradigm. The best example of the ability of elite business 
networks to extend their influence into the international system 
has been the World Economic Forum that ha been meeting 
annually in Davos, Switzerland. The WEF was begun modesrly 
three decades ago by the Swiss business visionary, Klaus Schwab. 
During its early years the WEF concentrated its efforts primarily 
on rather humdrum management issues. In the early 19805, 
however, it succeeded in transforming itself into a political forum. 
In many ways Davos as we know it today is the legacy of earlier 
attempts to create transnational networks tasked with joining 
together international corporate and policy-making elites. Most 
observers agree that the most prominent of these precursors to 
the WEF was the highly secretive Bilderberg Conferences. Also 
important was David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission (which 
also began in the 1970s, with an immediate display of influence 
on the highest levels of governmental decision-making in the 
industrial countries of the North before largely fading out of 
sight, in large part because Western governments adopted and 
acted upon its policy agenda). In terms of sheer concenrration of 
super-elites from around the world, however, there has never 
been anything approaching the scale and salience that has been 
achieved by Davos over the course of the late 1990s. Annually, 
1,000 of the world's most powerful executives and another 1,000 
of the world's senior policy-makers participate in a week of 
roundtables, discussions, lectures and presentations by world 
leaders. 
But Davos has become much more than an assemblage of the 
rich and famous, although it is far less menacing and conspira-
torial than its most severe critics allege, and it espouses no 
grandiose project that seeks to rule the world. At the same time, 
its advocates often make claims that stretch the reality of its 
considerable influence beyond the point of credibility. The WEF 
provides flexible arenas for discussion and recommendation that 
give its membership the ability to shape global policy on a 
continuous and effective basis. It is notable ,-hat the UN Secretary-
General's ideas about a partnership with business and civil society 
have been put forwal-d as proposals during several high-profile 
appearances by Kofi Annan at Davos. In addition to encouraging 
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the development of its own well-articulated approaches to global 
problems on the basis of neo-liberal precepts, the WEF conducts 
and disseminates its own research, which not surprisingly exhibits 
a consistent economistic outlook that portrays the future as 
market-driven. The WEF produces an annual index ranking the 
relative economic competitiveness of all countries in the world, 
which is given substantial media attention at the time or release 
each year. 
There is no objective way to gauge the extent of influence 
exerted by Davos. Its own claims as a l'acililator of conflict 
resolution are often not convincing. For example, the WEF takes 
credit for facilitating early meetings between the apartheid regime 
and the ANC, and for bringing Israeli Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat together in 1992, where 
they purportedly reached a preliminary agreement on Palestinian 
administration of Gaza and Jericho. The WEF is far more discreet 
about claiming any direct influence on global social and econ-
?mic policy, being sensitive to accusations of back channel lobby-
Ing on behalf of transnational corporate interests. If the focus is 
placed on global economic policy then Davos together with other 
overlapping networks of corporate elites, such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce, seems to have been remarkably success-
ful up to this time in shaping the global policy setting in direc-
lions to its liking. This success is illustrated by the expansion of 
international trade regimes, trends toward privatization, the main-
tenance of modest regulation of capital markets, the credibility 
aCcorded only to a neo-liberal interpretation of state/market 
relations, and the supportive collaboration of most governments, 
especially those in the North. 
All in all the WEF has managed to position itself so as to 
provide a vital arena of inquiry and decision during t.his early 
stage of economic globalization. Such positioning has reduced 
the significance of democratic forces operating within states in 
relation to foreign economic policy, which in turn strengthens 
the argument to provide opportunities for civic participation in 
transnational institutional settings that will offset the impact of 
the multinational corporate arenas and give more voice to grass-
roots and populist concerns. Again, the focus on this dynamic is 
likely to be lost in the short-term aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, which has temporarily restored the state as guardian of 
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security to its traditional pre-eminence. Underlying globalizing 
trends are likely with the passage of time, however, to reassert the 
significance of establishing the structures of global governance in 
forms that take into account the goals of both market and 
transnational civic forces. 
A GPA as the logical outcome of the process of global 
democratization 
Putting aside the backlash against the global conference format, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that the international system is now 
exhibiting greater participation by non-state actors than ever 
before in its history. Without question, global civil society is 
unable to equal the influence, resources and power linkages of 
the corporate and banking communities. Nevertheless, relying on 
imagination and information, many of these civic networks have 
found ways to carve out a niche within the international order 
that enables effective pressures to be mounted. At the same time, 
there are many shortcomings of such an ad hoc and improvised 
approach to global democracy. This transformation of the inter-
national system has been occurring in a largely uncoordinated 
and uneven fashion that further tends to disadvantage the con-
cerns of the weakest and poorest. This obscures the need to 
connect these two types of globalizing networks (from above, 
from below) in a manner that is coherent, fair and efficient from 
the perspective of global governance. 
In effect, what we have at present is a partial transplant from 
domestic political systems where interest group pluralism flour-
ishes within an overarching representative structure of parliamen-
tary decision-making. At the global level we currently have 
rudimentary interest group pluralism, but it is deficient in several 
respects . There is a lack of accountability due to the absence of a 
representative structure and a low quality of functionality as a 
result of statist unwillingness to provide institutional capabilities 
for transnational political life. We believe this to be an inherently 
unsustainable path to a more evolved global system that is 
humane and comes to approximate a democratic model. What is 
notably missing from these intersecting forms of transnationalism 
is some type of unifying parliamentary body that can represent 
general as well as special interests. 
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The prevailing understanding of democracy today rejecLS the 
view that organized interest groups can validly claim to represent 
society as a whole. As global civil society has become morc of an 
international presence, those opposing its agenda and activism 
have already begun to ask upon what basis are those wiLhin it 
entitled to represem the peoples of the world. Awkward questions 
are asked: 'Who other than themselves do civil society organiza-
tions speak for?' 'Who elected them?' 'To whom are they account-
able for their actions?' As global civil society becomes more 
influential, and as more ideologically diverse and antagonistic 
groups such as, for example, the American National Rifle Associ-
ation, or for thaL matter Islamic fundamentalist organizations, 
clamour for access to global arenas of decision, this problem of 
representation can only become more complex and ever more 
hotly contested. 
This illegitimacy charge can be equally levelled at the Davos 
improvisation, which, unlike civil society, does not even possess 
that degree of representativeness that comes from having within 
its ranks large membership organizations. Certainly those citizens 
who oppose mainstream globalization regard the Davos model of 
elite politics to be extremely suspect. Such an assessment of these 
transnational developments suggests that the kinds of opening of 
the international system that have been occurring do not satisfy 
the demand for democratic participation. Something more is 
needed. Some sort of popular assembly capable of more systemat-
ically representing the diverse peoples of the world is necessary if 
the democratic deficit is to be meaningfully reduced. To the 
extent that the global undertakings are criticized for their failure 
to measure up to modern democratic standards, then world order 
seems ever more vulnerable to the charge of being more of an 
insiders' game than all but the most corrupt and draconian 
domestic political systems. Even before the events of September 
11 it was evident that those whose interests were not being 
addressed, were unwilling to accept the legitimacy of existing 
global arrangements. It seems likely that given the continuation 
of these conditions, that the democratic deficit will grow even 
larger, leading to the further proliferation of various types of 
severe instability, which are currently causing such widespread 
turmoil and suffering in the world system. 
The absence of a unifying parliamentary structure also means 
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that there is currently no institutional vessel capable of bringing 
together the organized groupings of transnational activism that 
are identified with civil society alld the Davos constituencies so a 
to facilitate dialogue, and the search for compromises and accom-
modations. As matters now stand, only governments have the 
institutional capacity to find such common ground and strike 
deals. As we discussed previously, there is no process for individu-
als and groups themselves to create a social consensus acros 
borders or to engage formally with those acting on behalf of 
market forces. To the extent that solu tions to globaJ problems 
can be arrived at within a structure that institutionalizes interac-
tion and allows for direct communication among competing 
interests, such interests will be much more likely to accep t as 
legitimate, policy outcomes U1at have been fairly negotiated and 
agreed upon. 
A GPA as a practical political project 
We believe that the establishment of some sort of parliamentary 
assembly is necessary to begin to deal seriously with the demo-
cratic deficit.. At the same time we realize that scepticism is 
rampant: is the creation of such a global assembly politically 
possibJe at this stage of history? For a variety of reasons, we believe 
that it is not Panglossian to believe it possible for the global 
community to take this vital step in building global democracy. 
Mter all, empirically suggesting the viability of such a project is 
the European Union, which has been making impressive attempts 
to overcome a purported regional democratic deficit. The EU 
already possesses a transnationally elected legislative body, the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament, along with the 
European Council and the European Commission, is one of three 
legislative bodies operating within the framework of the European 
Union. As we would expect to be the case with a globally elected 
assembly, the Parliament has struggled to establish credibility over 
time in the face of statist scepticism and media scorn. In recent 
years, however, the European Parliament has fll1ally begun to 
gain respect, and has started to exercise significant power. Europe 
is, of course, far more homogeneous and economically integrated 
than the world at large, and the establishment of the Parliament 
was a part of a broader movement toward regional unity. At the 
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same time this European evolution shows that there are no 
~bsolute political or logistical barriers to the creation and func-
tJ.oning of such an assembly on a transnational scale, and further, 
that such a development is fully compatible with the persistence 
of strong states and robust nationalist sentiments. In fact, on a 
global level, those with a pronounced interest in global gover-
nance - civil society, the corporate eli te, and many governments 
- have an individual as well as collective stake in erecting some 
type of overarching democratic structure. 
The role of civil society 
Certain sector·s of civil society in particular could likely be, and in 
fact are being, mobilized to lead the drive for such an assembly.5 
This is import.ant, because while there is the potential to find 
some support from corporate and political elites, it is unrealistic 
to expect the main initiative to come from these sectors. Most of 
the individuals leading business and governmental organizations 
tend to be institutionally conservative, as well as often too closely 
linked to state structures to support such a bold initiative. For 
these reasons, the primary energy for a global parliament will 
come from civil society, or nowhere. 
It is rather obvious, however, that not even all civil society 
organizations are in favour of the creation of such an assembly. 
Some evidently sense tl1at their influence would shrink in an 
altered world order. Nevert.heless, the sentiments throughout 
global civil society are overwhelmingly in favour of establishing 
institutions and practices that will enable global democracy to 
flourish in the years ahead. Within this broader consensus there 
exists a realization that the creation of a functioning global 
parliament or assembly is a necessary and desirable step. The 
appeal of the GPA proposal to advance the agenda of global civil 
society seems rather obvious. At a general level, a democratically 
constituted assembly would be likely to address widespread socie-
tal concerns about the undemocratic nature of existing inter-
national institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It would 
almost certainly encourage furtl1er democratizing global reforms, 
as well as provide a setting for debates about the positive and 
negative effects of globalization. There would for the first time a 
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widely recognized global forum in which such mallers of public 
be concern as environmental quality, labour standards, and ecoO-
omic justice could be discussed from a variet)' of perspectives, 
including encounters between civil society representatives from 
North and South who set forth contrasting concerns embodyiog 
differing priorities. The presence of democratic structures does 
not, of course, guarantee that participants will consistently behave 
responsibly. We have learned from experience that even tlle most 
experienced and respected legislative institutions witl1in states can 
act in an erratic fashion from time to time that does not reflect 
me real interests or values of constituents, but such is the cost 
incurred to sustain democratic processes as me basis of 
governance . 
Even an initially weak and controversial global assembly could 
at least provide the beginnings of democratic oversight and 
accountability for the international system. The fact that individ-
uals from many parts of me world would directly participate in 
elections would likely lead me assembly to have an impressive 
grassroots profile mat would lend a certain populist authenticity 
to its pronouncements and recommendations. In all probability, 
at first, most governments would refuse to defer to such an 
assembly that operated beyond meir control, but such rejectionist 
attitudes would be unlikely to persist very long. Mter all, we are 
living at a time when democracy has increasingly become the sine 
qua non of legitimacy around the world and the assembly would 
be the only institution that could validly claim to represent the 
peoples of global societ)' directly. The comparison of its views with 
those of governments and market-dominated forums would likely 
attract media attention before long; becoming a part of public 
discourse would in turn influence the course of civil-political 
decision-making. 
Besides exercising a democratic influence on the formulation 
of social policy, such an assembly could also be instrumental in 
helping to encourage compliance with international norms and 
standards, especially in the realm of widely supported human 
rights. Currently, the international system generally lacks reliable 
mechanisms to implement many of its laws. Civil society organiza-
tions such as Amnest)' International, and even international 
organizations such as the International Labor Organization and 
the UN Human Rights Commission, attempt to address this 
RICHARD FALK AND ANDREW STRAUSS 221 
d~ficiency and exert significant pressure on states by exposing 
failures of compliance by states, relying on a process that is often 
referred to as the 'mobilization of shame'. This pressure is 
premised on the importance to governments of sustaining their 
reputation for acting in conformity with normative standards and 
the reliability of established NGOs in identifying patterns of 
abusive behaviour. In contributing to such an oversight function, 
a popularly elected GPA would likely soon become more visible 
and credible than are existing informal watchdogs that seek to 
expose corporate and governmental wrongdoing, and in any 
event, would complement such activism. A GPA would also tend 
to be less deferential to leading sovereign states than the more 
official watchdogs that function within the essentially statist frame-
work of the United Nations System. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the mere existence and availabi-
lity of the assembly would likely be helpful in promoting the 
peaceful resolution of international conflicts. We have already 
discussed how a GPA might be useful in undermining wider 
circles of societal support for international terrorism as a form of 
non-state violence. It could also in time help to reduce the 
likelihood of interstate violence as well. Instead of representing 
states, as in the United Nations and other established inter-
national organizations, delegates would directly represent various 
constituencies with societal roots. This means that, unlike the 
present system, the assembly would not be designed to reinforce 
artificially constructed 'national interests' or to promote the 
special projects of rich and influential elites. Rather, as in multi-
national societies such as India or Switzerland, or in the European 
Parliament, most elected delegates do not consistently or mechan-
ically vote along national lines, except possibly in instances where 
their national origins are directly engaged with the issue in 
dispute. Coalitions form in these settings on other bases, such as 
worldview, political orientation, class and racial solidarities, and 
ethical affinities. The experience of engaging in a democratic 
process to reach legislative compromises on the part of antago-
nists that are organized as opposing, but non-militarized and 
often shifting, coalitions may over time help establish a culture of 
peace. It is perhaps too optimistic to think that such a learning 
curve might eventually undermine reliance on the present war 
system to sustain national and global security. It is difficult to 
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transform the militarist mentalities associated with the pursuit of 
security in a world that continues to be organized around the 
prerogatives of sovereign national units that are heavily armed 
and disposed to destroy one another if the need arises . The 
hope is that over time the organization of international relations 
would come more closely to resemble decision-making within the 
most democratic societies of the world. Not only would an assem-
bly tend to oppose military establishments as d1e foundation of 
global security, but it is also likely to build confidence in the 
perspectives of human security and in the efficacy of peaceful 
approaches to world order. Only when enough people begin 
someday to feel that non-violent structures of governance, includ-
ing law enforcement, can ensure their individual and collective 
survival will meaningful disarmament become a genuine political 
option. 
Any proposed institution that can credibly claim a potential for 
advancing causes as central to the agenda of various global civil 
society organizations as global democratization, labour and 
environmental regulation, effective global governance, peace, and 
human rights obviously should possess the capacity t.o generate 
broad-based support within civil society. So far, however, the 
nascent civil society movement that favours the establishment of 
such an assembly remains separate and distinct. It has not man-
aged to gain significant levels of support, or even interest, from 
the issue-oriented actors that have so far been the main architects 
of global civil society. The present movement for an assembly 
consists mainly of individuals and groups who believe in holistic 
solutions to global problems, and seek to promote humane global 
governance for the world. Such proponents of a GPA are cultur-
ally influenced by a range of contemporary traditions of thought 
and modalities of action as varied as ecology, religion, spirituality, 
humanism and, most recendy of all, the Internet. Each of these 
orientations proceeds from a premise of human solidarity and a 
belief in the essential unity of planet earth. Significant organizing 
efforts associated either with building support for the GPA or 
experimenting with its local enactment are under way in many 
different places around t.he world. This is an exciting develop-
ment. It portends the possibility that from within civil society a 
truly innovative and visionary politics is beginning to take shape 
after centuries of dormancy. Such movement is an expression of 
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the in . 
creasmg robustness of democratic values as the foundation 
for. all forms of political legitimacy regardless of the scale of the 
UnIt of social action being appraised. Also relevant are many types 
of transnational connectivity that manifest the globalizing ethos 
of OUr twenty-first-century world. 
The receptivity of the business elite to a GPA 
The global outlook of tl1e corporate and financial elites repre-
sented at Davos, and elsewhere is also relevant to tl1e prospects 
f?r furthering the cause of a GPA. The Davos network has been 
Smgularly Successful in marshalling support for new international 
regimes iliat promote its interests in an open global economy. 
The World Trade Organization and NAFTA are two obvious 
examples. Certainly some within its ranks will oppose a new 
global parliamentary institution because a more open political 
~ystem would mean a broader decision-making base, a question-
Lng of the distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic 
growth, and more pressure for transnational regulation of mar-
ket forces. Such developments would almost certainly be viewed 
with suspicion, if not hostility, by those who meet regularly at 
Davos to construct a world economy that is committed to the 
'efficient' use of capital, and dubious about any incorporation of 
social and normative goals into ilie formation of world economic 
policy. It would almost certainly be the case that such an assem-
bly, if reflective of grassroots opinion around the world, would 
be highly critical of current modes of globalization, and hence 
at odds witl1 the outcomes sought by the Davos leadership. But 
with transnational corporations having been, and in all likeli-
hood continuing to be, beneficiaries of this globalization-from-
above, those in the business world with a more enlightened sense 
of their long-term interest are already coming to believe that the 
democratic deficit must be addressed by way of stakeholder 
accommodations. It is perhaps relevant to recall that although 
hostile at first, many members of the American managerial class 
came under tl1e pressure of the Great Depression and its societal 
unrest to realize that the New Deal was a necessary dynamic of 
adjustment to the claims of workers and the poor during a crisis 
time for capitalism. The same kind of dynamic made social 
democracy acceptable to the business/financial leadership of 
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leading European countries, and helped give capitalism a more 
human face that enhanced its legitimacy at the level of society. 
In a similar vein, many of the leading figures in world business 
seem to find congenial the idea that some sort of democratizing 
improvisation along the lines we are suggesting is necessary to 
make globalization politically acceptable to more of the peoples 
of the world. 
As the large street protests of the last few years in various places 
around the world suggested to many observers, globalization has 
not yet managed to achieve grassroots acceptance and societal 
legitimacy. Lori Wallach (the prime organizer of the Seattle anti-
WTO demonstrations) said in an interview tl1at her coalition of 
so many diverse groups, in addition to battling a series of distinct 
social issues, was held t.ogether by the 'notion that the democracy 
deficit in the global economy is neither necessary nor 
acceptable' .6 
In fact, the main basis of popular support for globalization at 
present is not political, but economic. Globalization has eitl1er 
been able to deliver or to hold out tl1e promise of delivering we 
economic goods to enough people to keep the anti-globalization 
forces from gaining sufficient ground to mount an effective 
challenge against it. Economic legitimacy alone is rarely able to 
stabilize a political system for long. Market-based economic sys-
tems have h istorically undergone ups and downs, particularly 
when they are in formation. The emerging-markets financial crisis 
that almost triggered a world financial meltdown in 1997 will 
surely not be the last crisis to emerge from the current modalities 
of globalization. Future economic failures are certain to generate 
strong and contradictory political responses . We know that stand-
ing in the wings, not only in the United States but in several other 
countries, are poli ticians, ultra-nationalists, and an array of oppor-
tunists on both the left and the right who, if given an opening, 
would seek to d ismantle the system so as to restore territorial 
sovereignty, and with it, nationalism and protectionism. If the 
globalizing elite is seeking to find a political base that will allow it 
to survive economic downturns, particularly in the event that 
economic and social forces in powerful countries are in the future 
adversely affected, then it would do well to turn its attention 
urgently to reducing the global democratic deficit. Global terror 
plays a diversionary role at present, especially in the United States, 
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but this disu'action from the imperatives of global reform are not 
likely to persist, especially in the face of widespread economic 
hardship and distress. 
There is a lesson to be learned from Suharto's Indonesia that 
offers some striking parallels to the vulnerabilities of the current 
global system. Indonesian citizens had come to believe in demo-
cratic practices, but the political system remained largely authori-
tarian, and unresponsive to the concerns of the people. As long 
as Indonesia was both a Cold War ally of the West and enjoyed 
the dramatic economic growth rates that had been sustained for 
nearly 30 years, American support was solid and there were 
enough benefits for most of the population to control political 
restiveness in a country with many acute ethnic and regional 
tensions. The great majority of the Indonesian people seemed 
either intimidated or willing to tolerate the country's failure to 
live up to the democratic ideal. But when the economy found 
itself in serious trouble during the last months of 1997, President 
Suharto had little to fall back upon internally or externally to 
maintain the political allegiance of the citizenry and his political 
edifice, which had seemed so formidable just months earlier. The 
Jakarta regime rapidly crumbled around him. The latent political 
illegitimacy of the Java-centric Indonesian government became a 
destabilizing factor that accompanied and intensified the econ-
omic and ethnic tribulations of the country. 
The receptivity of the political elite to a GPA 
Portions of the corporate elite might be persuaded that it is in 
their interest to support a GPA. Would not those who control 
state power, however, be less likely to go along with such an 
innovation? Surely any public institution that could reduce the 
global democratic deficit by claiming to speak directly for global 
society could eventually become an important counterweight to 
state and market power. The important word here is eventually. 
A relatively weak assembly constituted initially mainly with advi-
sory powers would begin to address concerns about the demo-
cratic deficit while posing only a long-term threat to the citadels 
of state power. This being the case national leaders, whose 
concerns tend to be associated with short-term prerogatives, have 
little reason to feel significantly challenged by the establishment 
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of such an assembly. Systemic transformation of world order that 
could affect successors would not to be threatening to, and might 
in fact appeal to those political leaders who are themselves most 
inclined to extend democratic ideals to all arenas of authority 
and decision. 
Putting in place a minimally empowered, but politically sale-
able institutional structure that nonetheless has far-reaching trans-
formative potential is, in fact, an approach often adopted by the 
most effective advocates of new global institl.ltions. What has 
become the European Union, for example, began after the 
Second World War as the European Coal and Steel Community, 
a modest, skeletal framework for what would decades later evolve 
into an integrated European political structure that more recently 
poses some serious challenges to the primacy of the European 
state. The French Declaration of 9 May 1950 initially proposing 
the European Coal and Steel Community makes clear that this 
humble beginning was by design: 
Europe will not be made all aL once, or according LO a single plan. 
[The French Government) proposes that Franco-German production 
of coal and sLeel as a whole be placed under a common High 
Au thoriLy, within the framework of an organization open to the 
participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal 
and steel production should immedialely provide [or the selting up of 
common foundations [or economic developmenl as a first step in the 
federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of Lhose regions 
which have long been devoled to the manufacture of munitions of 
war, of which they have been the most constant of victims.' 
Within the European Union, by far the best model for a 
globally representative assembly, the European Parliament started 
life as an institutional vessel largely devoid of formal powers. 
Through time, as the sale direct representative of tl1e European 
citizenry, me Parliament began to acquire an important. institu-
tional role that has given vit.ality to the undertaking, as well as 
increasingly reinforcing the European will to carry on witl1 their 
bold experiment in regional governance. 
One source of optimism that many national leaders can be 
persuaded to support mis assembly project arises from the recent 
experience of building a coalition to push for the establishment 
of a permanent International Criminal Court. A large number of 
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civil society organizations, working in collaboration with govern-
ments, have been very effective, at least" so far,s in building wide-
spread cooperation among political elites around the world Oll 
behalf of a project that only a decade earlier had been dismissed 
as utopian. The willingness of political leaders to support the 
creation of such a tribunal is quite surprising. It also lends indirect 
encouragement to efforts to establish a GPA because the criminal 
COUrt compromises traditional sovereign prerogatives far more 
than would be the case initially if a global parliament comes into 
existence. The court has the substan tive power to prosecute indi-
viduals for their failure to comply with international criminal law, 
which means that states have lost exclusive control over the appli-
cation of penal law, which had been regarded as one of the 
traditional and fundamenta l attributes of sovereignty. Government 
leaders have lost their immunity to some extent in relation to 
international standards. By comparison a parliament with largely 
advisory powers would appear to be a relatively modest concession 
to the growing demand for a more democratic and legitimate 
global order, and would initially not sigllificantly impinge upon 
the exercise of sovereign powers of a state. Of course, the idea of a 
parallel international law-making body, even if advisory, does raise 
the possibility in the moral and political imagination, that more 
centralization of authority is necessary and desirable, and this 
possibility, however remote, is likely to be threatening to govern-
ments administering nation-states. 
Realizing the vision 
While the rationale for establishing such an assembly definitely 
exists, this is, of course, not enough. There needs to be some 
viable way for this potential to be realized. We believe the formula 
with the best ability to take advantage of the political promise we 
have identified can be found in what is being called the 'New 
Diplomacy'. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which is solely con-
ducted among states, the New Diplomacy is based on the Collabo-
ration of civil society with whatever s~tes ar~ .receptive, allOwing 
the formation of flexible and innovative coahtions that shift from 
issue to issue and over time. The major success stories of global 
civil society in the 1990s were produced in this manner including 
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the Global Warming Treaty, the Landmines Convention and the 
International Criminal Court. 
This New Diplomacy (if it is to continue into this new century) 
is well adapted to meeting the challenge of creating a globally 
elected assembly. Nevertheless, the seemingly most natural way to 
bring a new international regime into being, a large-scale multi-
lateral conference, does not appear well suited to this project. 
Despite the receptivity of some political elites, there is unlikely to 
be a critical mass of states in the UN General Assembly or outside 
its confines that would be willing to call for the convocation of 
such a conference. We believe that the momentum that would 
lead to significant state support for the assembly would undoubt-
edly have to be developed indirectly and gradually. Two other 
possible approaches seem worth considering in relation to bring-
ing the GPA into being. 
One approach that we discuss in more detail in the Summer 
2000 edition of the Sta,nfordJournal of International Law D would be 
for civil society with the help of receptive states t.o proceed to 
create the assembly without resorting to a formal treaty process. 
Under this approach the assembly would not be formally sanC-
tioned by the collectivity of states and hence its legitimacy would 
probably be contested by governments at the outset unless they 
chose to ignore its existence altogether. This opposition could be 
neutralized to some extent by widespread grassroots and media 
endorsement, and by the citizenry as expressed through popular 
elections that were taken seriously by large numbers of people 
and were fairly administered. 
The other approach is to rely on a treaty, but to utilize what is 
often called the Single Negotiating Text Method as the process 
for coming to an agreement on the specifics of an assembly 
among supportive states. Pursuant to this approach after extensive 
consultations with sympathetic parties from civil society, business 
and nation-states, an organizing committee would generate the 
text of a treaty establishing an assembly that could serve as the 
basis for negotiations. Momentum could be generated as civil 
society organized a public relations campaign and some states 
were persuaded (sometimes as a result of agreed upon modifica-
tions in the draft) to accede to the treaty one at a time. As in the 
Ottawa Process that ultimately led to the Landmines Convention, 
a small core group of supportive states could lead the way. Unlike 
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the Landmines treaty, however, which it was thought could not 
m.eaningfully come into effect before forty countries ratified it, a 
relatively small number of countries, say twenty, could provide 
the founding basis to bring such an assembly into being. Though 
this number is but a fraction of what would eventually be needed 
If the assembly wished to have some claim to global democratic 
legitimacy, it is worth remembering that the European Coal and 
Steel Community, which evolved to become the European Union, 
Started with only six countries. After all, once the assembly was 
established and functioning in an impressive way the task of 
gaining additional state members should become easier. There 
Would then exist a concrete organization to which states could 
~Ctually be urged to join by their own citizens. As more states 
JOined, pressure on the remaining states to allow their citizens to 
VOte and participate would likely grow, especially if the assembly 
bUilt a positive reputation in its early years. Holdout states would 
:ncreasingly find themselves in the embarrassing position of being 
In a dwindling minority of states denying their citizens the ability 
to participate along with persons from foreign countries in the 
World's only globally elected body. It would seem increasingly 
perverse to proclaim democratic values at home but resist demo-
Cratic practices and possibilities abroad. The exact nature of the 
representative parliamentary stmcture that should or will be 
created remains to be determined, and should be resolved 
through vigorous discussion by many different actors drawn from 
all corners of the world. What is clear to us, however, is that the 
Ongoing phenomena of global democratization are part of an 
:volutionary social process that will persist, and intensify. While it 
IS still too early to determine the long-term implications of the 
eVents of September 11, the future will surely find many ways to 
rernind the peoples of the world that a commitment to global 
dernocratic governance is a matter of urgency, and that a way to 
Illove forward is through the establishment of a GPA. 
Until the onset of the global terror challenge, the two domi-
nant themes of the post-Cold War years were globalization and 
~lernocracy. Proclamations are now commonplace that the world 
IS rapidly creating an integrated global political economy and that 
national governments that are not freely elected lack political 
legitimacy. In view of this, it is paradoxical that there has not yet 
been a serious global debate on concrete proposals to resolve the 
230 DEBATING COSMOPOLITICS 
obvious contradiction between a professed commitment to 
democracy at the level of the sovereign state and a manifestly 
undemocratic global political-economic order. Perhaps this 
apparent tension can be explained as a form of political inertia, 
and possibly by the residual sense that such democratizing pro-
posals are still per se utopian. Whatever the explanation. this 
contradict.ion will not be tolerated for long. Citizen groups and 
business and financial elites are Hot waiting around for govern-
ments to come up with solutions. They have taken direct aJ1d 
concrete action to realize their aspirations. These initiatives have 
created an autonomous dynamic resulting in spontaneous forms 
of global democratization. As this process continues in an attempt 
to keep pace with globalization, as it surely will, the movement 
for a coherent and legitimate syst.em of global democracy will and 
should intensify. To political elites it will continue to become 
increasingly obvious that without legitimating institutions, govern-
ing the global order will be more difficult and contentious. TheY 
are likely to be plagued by the growing disinclination of citizens 
to accept the policy results of an ever-more encompassing systeJ11 
that is not based on a recognizable form of legitimate governance. 
To the organized networks of global civil society and business th.e 
inclination, reinforced by t.he practice of democratic societies, 15 
to find direct accommodations and to work out differences. Such 
a process will naturally lead policy-makers to look toward familiar 
democratic structures to bridge present, widening cleavages. 
Finally, to all those who are seriously concerned abou t social 
justice, and the creation of a more peaceful global order, tbe 
democratic alternative to an inherently authoritarian global sys-
tem will surely be ever more compelling. 
Notes 
1. The authors would like to thank Erin Daly and Daniele Archibugi fof 
their very helpful comments on early drafts of this chapter. . 
2. See Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, 'Toward Global Pariiaruenl , 
Foreign AffaiTs, January-February 2001, p.212; Richard Falk and AndreW 
Strauss, 'On Ille Creation of a Global Peoples' Assembly: Legitimacy and "~ 
Power of Popular Sovereign ty', StanJord journal of International Law, vol. 3 i 
2000; Andrew Strauss, 'Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Glob;!, 
System: The Promise of a Peoples' Assembly', 7'mnsnationalJonr!1aZ oj LatV alii 
Conte'lntJormy Problems, vol. 9, 1999. 
RICHARD FALK AND ANDREW STRAUSS 231 
3. J essica T. Mathews, 'Powershifts', Fomign tVfrtils,January-February 1997, 
p. 50. 
A e~' These were: on sustainable devC'lop~1ent, the Rio Declaratio.n and 
C?,lcta 21; to help safeguard the planet s bIOdiversity, the BIOdiverSity 
tnvelltion ; a lld perhaps most importantly, 1.0 combat the warming of the 
paneL. tbe Climate Cha nge Convention . 
5. "''bile ~ti ll in their early stages, we believe V"drio LiS initia tives merit 
;lollce. An o rganiza tio n called Ih e Assembly of the Unit('d NatiollS of Peoples 
I:
as 
att empted 10 brin g civil society o rga nizations together inl.O a quasi-
epreSentative assembly. In Ihe fall of 2001 it included civil society organiza-
~ons from the majority of the world 's countries in it s fourth assembly in 
e1ugla, Italy. Also notable is the Global Peopl('s ' Assembly Movement. This 
~rgallization had its i-irst m~!jor assembly in Samoa in April 2000. Like the 
. er'ugla initiative. its purpose is to mode l a g lo bally democratic institutional 
StrUCture tha t would e nable the peopl es of the world to have a meaningiul 
VOIC . 
_ e. I n global govemance. Also worthy of a ttention a rc efforts by an 
o~galllZation called Citizen Celltury to link the nation al parliamentarians 
~ the wodd toge ther through the Intern et into what it: calls a 'Global 
-ParlIament' and efforts by The World Citizen Foundation to promote the 
establishment of a globally elected parliament. 
6. See Lori 's War, Fo-reign Policy, March 2000, p . 28. 
5 7. See http://europa .eu.in t/comm/ dglO/ publications/brochures/docu/ 
Oansl elect _e n. h tml #c1eclara tio 
8. The Statute for the Intel'llalional Criminal Court was overwhelmingly 
adOpted by a confe re n ce of states in Rome 011 17 July 1998. The StaUlte 
~~ce~ved the necessary ratificatiolls and came into force in 2002 despite 
stt lICflon from the United States. 
P 9. See ill hard Falk and Andrew Strauss, 'On ule Creatioll of a Global 
r eOples' Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty', Stanford 
J
Oll'r1'!l{/ of Inh"Y'lwlional Law. 
